Speech The Riksdag, 2 September 2008 22 September 2008
Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Government informs the Riksdag on the conflict between Georgia and Russia, 2 September 2008

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Mr Speaker,

International law is a crucial principle in every attempt to build a lasting peace.

In Europe we have every reason to proceed from the principles laid down in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The extraordinary meeting of the European Council held in Brussels yesterday once again underlined the importance we attach to them.

Allow me to briefly quote from some of the most important principles:

The right of all states to territorial integrity, freedom and political independence.

All states' frontiers are inviolable. The principle that frontiers can change, but only in accordance with international law and by agreement.

All states must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Unless there is express support from the Charter of the United Nations, no consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

All disputes are to be settled by peaceful means.

All states shall refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another state.

There is every reason to level strong criticism against the reciprocal escalation of violence in South Ossetia, and against Georgia's decision to launch a major offensive in the area on the night of 7 August.

But none of this gave Russia any right to resort to the use of massive military force against Georgia in the way that it did.

It is clear that this aggression and Russia's subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia represent clear and unequivocal breaches of the fundamental principles guiding relations between states in Europe that I have just quoted.

And it is therefore also natural for us to have reacted very firmly to what has happened. To neglect to do so would be to weaken the principles that must underpin every lasting peace in Europe.

Of course, every conflict of this kind should be placed in its historical context.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the then Russian leadership accepted the right of the former Soviet Republics to self-determination within the frontiers that existed at the time.

These frontiers were not always ethnic frontiers, but the decision to accept them was a decision that spared this vast area much of the bloodshed that unfortunately came to befall a different part of Europe.

However, a series of conflicts broke out in the Caucasus. But the ambition has been to resolve them all - around Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia and South Ossetia - within the framework of respect for the territorial integrity of the states concerned. Up until now the consensus has been that every deviation from this principle would create serious risks for the future.

I also say this to emphasise the seriousness of Russia's decision to abandon this principle by deciding to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.

This overall picture should also include the tension that has developed since 2003 between a Russia that has chosen to follow a more authoritarian political course and a Georgia that - not least as a result of increasing pressure from Russia - has chosen to follow an ever clearer western course and made major progress towards democracy.

A concrete manifestation of this was when approximately 80 per cent of Georgians voted in a referendum earlier this year in favour of their country joining NATO.

This tension has gradually escalated in recent months. The start of this phase of the conflict can perhaps be dated to the Russian presidential decree of 16 April that was intended to pave the way for a gradual absorption of the two Georgian conflict regions into Russia.

Unfortunately we know what the stages were in the escalation that followed. Then came the showdown at the beginning of August with five days of open warfare when Russia attacked Georgia following the latter's serious escalation of hostilities in South Ossetia.

Following the intervention of the European Union, an agreement could be reached to end hostilities and seek a solution in accordance with six principles. An important element of these was that all combat forces were to withdraw to the positions they had held before hostilities began on 7 August.

When the heads of state and government - as well as the foreign ministers - met in Brussels yesterday, there was agreement that Russia had not fully respected these principles, despite some withdrawals. Russian military positions deep inside Georgia proper are not compatible with the agreements entered into.

Yesterday's meeting ended in agreement on three key conclusions:

Firstly - the demand for a full Russian withdrawal in accordance with the six-point plan. Until this has happened, the planned negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia will be put on hold.

Secondly - strong support for Georgia and an equally clear and important opening for new and closer relations between the EU and Georgia. A support conference will be quickly arranged, and other important measures prepared.

Thirdly - fresh support for proposals previously initiated primarily by Poland and Sweden on a more active common European policy towards our partner countries to the east.

Whereas it was previously intended that a more concrete discussion on this would take place next spring, we are now moving towards a discussion as early as at the next summit in October and a decision in December. Great importance is attached to relations with Ukraine.

One should add to this the obvious conclusion that every form of recognition of the two breakaway republics should be rejected - we intend to announce more concrete measures in this respect following a report from the Commission - and that the EU's overall relations with Russia should be examined.

These issues will be discussed informally by the foreign ministers over the coming weekend.

This is our immediate policy. It is a strong and united European policy.

We will have a great many opportunities to comment on the long-term consequences of this war and this conflict on later occasions.

Allow me just to make two strategic observations.

Firstly - the threshold for Russia's use of military force in its immediate vicinity has clearly been lowered. This does not mean that it is this low everywhere, or that immediate parallels can be drawn between different situations. But that hardly reduces the gravity of this observation.

Secondly - with its decision to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, Russia has now opened up a series of issues in a way that risks causing future instability. I find it very difficult to see how this decision can be in Russia's own long-term interest, but unfortunately this does not change what has happened.

It remains to be seen how EU relations with Russia will be affected in the long term.

I fear that the course Russia has now chosen to follow will limit both its opportunities to continue its process of modernisation, which is so important, and the potential for deeper cooperation with the rest of Europe on a whole series of issues.

This is something that we have been forced to note, but that we have every reason to regret.

However, our task is to deal with the situation we are actually facing after the five-day crisis in the Caucasus. I hardly need to point out that Sweden will be playing an active role in forming overall European policy on these issues.